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The eurozone is a monetary union comprised of 19 European Union member states that 
share a currency called the euro.  To understand whether or not the eurozone is sustainable, we 
must first understand the previous major developments of the euro.  The first section will provide 
background on domestic motivations and sentiment towards the euro beginning in the time 
period before the introduction of the euro as a currency unit and highlight the resulting 
incomplete institutions and divergence from optimal currency area.  Next, the second section will 
discuss how the unsustainable pre-crisis construction of the eurozone highlighted these 
shortcomings.  To provide background, a brief narrative describing the events, causes, and effects 
of the crisis will be provided.  Economic theories that justified the incomplete structure of the 
eurozone are critically analyzed and additional construction faults are uncovered to consider the 
feasibility of the eurozone in its crisis-era state.  Additionally, the causes and effects of austerity, 
a devastating and ineffective strategy that attempted to remediate the issues of euro-area 
countries, are discussed and extrapolated to determine future issues the eurozone may face.  
 
The central role of the European Central Bank in the crisis is considered through the lens 
of its actions and inactions to understand the influences on the Bank and the conflicting visions 
for the eurozone’s future. Finally, in the last section, a judgement of implemented emergency 
measures and the eurozone’s current and future growth and debt prospects will be contrasted 
with required solutions needed to make the eurozone sustainable. Ultimately, the reason for the 
lack of collective willingness to implement needed measures is unearthed to determine that the 
eurozone is not sustainable as is. A deeper comparison of the unique problems that two large 
countries in opposite camps face will highlight additional struggles the eurozone bloc will have 
to overcome.  
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SECTION I: PRE-CRISIS 
 BACKGROUND  
Within the eurozone, there are two groups of countries that have different motivations, 
benefits, and costs associated with their joining the euro.  Often called the ‘core’ and the 
‘periphery’, the most commonly agreed upon academic definition of these groups is based on 
how synchronized their supply shocks are.1  In other words, the core is defined by countries that 
have similar economies and the periphery consists of those whose economies are not correlated 
with the core.  The core, which usually includes Germany, the Netherlands, and Austria, usually 
export more than they import, while the opposite is true for the periphery, which usually includes 
Portugal, Greece, Italy, and Spain.  Depending on the definition, France falls in to one of the two 
groups.  Each group had similar economic situations before joining the euro (with France’s 
situation being similar to the periphery).  In the two subsections below, the two situations are 
enumerated to illustrate the historical background of each group with a focus on ‘power players’, 
namely Germany and Italy.  The background explains what each group hoped to achieve through 
the euro and what they are unwilling to compromise on to see if these hopes and constraints are 
reconcilable and to evaluate the sustainability of the eurozone.  The incompleteness of the 
current framework is a product of this background; its divergences from optimal currency areas 
will be used to introduce the bloc’s foundational problems. 
  
                                                 
1 Nauro Campos and Corrado Macchiarelli, “A History of the European Core and Its Periphery: How an Optimal 
Currency Area Forms,” VoxEU.Org (blog), March 12, 2018, https://voxeu.org/article/history-european-core-and-its-
periphery. 
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WIRTSCHAFTSWUNDER 
Many of the same factors that enabled West Germany to rebuild very quickly after World 
War II were also used to catalyze the East German economy post-reunification and, more 
recently, have helped cause many tensions the eurozone currently faces. One of the largest 
drivers of this ‘economic miracle’ is the German labor model, which relies on the close 
collaboration of German unions and labor with corporations and industrial operators.  This close 
relationship underpinned much of post-reunification Germany’s growth and allowed Germany’s 
exports to be even more competitive abroad because of suppressed wages in the country relative 
to the rest of the eurozone.  From 2004 to 2007, for example, German wage growth was 0.6% 
annually, compared with a eurozone average of 3.5%.2  This disparity exists because instead of 
bargaining for higher wages, German unions focused on bargaining for quality-of-life 
improvements for workers to leverage productivity improvements without making German 
exports less competitive by increasing cost of inputs (i.e. wages).  The extent to which German 
nominal wages have remained flat can be seen in the graph below:3  
                                                 
2 “German Wage Growth Outpacing Rest of Eurozone, Study Shows,” April 23, 2018, 
https://www.thelocal.de/20180423/german-wage-growth-outpacing-rest-of-eurozone-study. 
3 Jörg Bibow, “On the Franco-German Euro Contradiction and Ultimate Euro Battleground,” Working Paper (Levy 
Economics Institute of Bard College, n.d.), 17, https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/79447/1/742474348.pdf. 
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A side effect of stagnant wages is that German workers’ ability to spend remained flat, meaning 
that other countries were not able to increase their exports to Germany.  And, as a result, because 
German individuals, companies, and the state itself have not been spending proportionally more 
domestically, other countries have to pick up this ‘slack’ and spend more than they ought to – 
visible in the current account deficits seen in Italy and Greece, among others.4  In addition, 
stagnant wages continued to increase German competitiveness because costs of production did 
not increase as fast as elsewhere in the bloc.  Such an imbalance is unsustainable because it 
makes one exporter too powerful—as capital flows to that country from the uncompetitive 
country, the captive uncompetitive country’s liabilities increase and its dependence on foreign 
                                                 
4 “Why Germany’s Current-Account Surplus Is Bad for the World Economy,” The Economist, July 8, 2017, 
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/07/08/why-germanys-current-account-surplus-is-bad-for-the-world-
economy. 
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financing increases.  This imbalance turns into a disaster in times of crisis when capital flows dry 
up.  Any such imbalance is unsustainable in the long run unless capital is transferred from the 
high-exporting country, which is a non-starter for Germany.   
In addition, German manufacturers received better access to the less competitive markets 
and were better able to outcompete manufacturers in other countries in their own home markets.  
As a result, the modern German state has the largest absolute current account surplus in the 
world, beating out countries such as Japan, the Netherlands, and China.5  Because the use of a 
common currency by Germany and the periphery stops Germany’s currency from becoming 
stronger as a result of its exporting nature, the methods and quantities of relative appreciations 
and devaluations are more important because they amplify current account imbalances. In fact, 
preventing the slow and steady strengthening of the Deutschemark was one of Germany’s main 
motivations for joining the euro. A combination of high interest rates designed to arrest inflation 
and high demand for German products (and demand for German currency to buy these goods) 
put strengthening pressure on the Deutschemark, which, if left unchecked, would make the 
Deutschemark too strong and undermine German exports.6  By joining the euro, Germany would 
be able to avoid this outcome by ensuring that the German currency of doing business remains 
artificially weaker than it would be if the country returned to the Deutschemark.  Over the two 
decades since the decision to join was made, this effect has been empirically shown – price 
indexes on a purchasing power parity basis indicate that the use of the euro by Germany has 
resulted in an undervaluation of between ten and twenty percent since adoption.7  In addition, the 
                                                 
5 Claire Jones, “Germany on Course for World’s Largest Current Account Surplus,” Financial Times, August 20, 
2018, https://www.ft.com/content/07610a3a-a492-11e8-926a-7342fe5e173f. 
6 Bibow, “On the Franco-German Euro Contradiction and Ultimate Euro Battleground,” 11. 
7 “Euro May Be Too Weak for Germany but Too Strong for Others,” Reuters, February 3, 2017, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-usa-trump-euro-analysis-idUSKBN15I1ND. 
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European Commission found that between the inception of the euro and the second quarter of 
2016, the German real exchange rate, which measures “how much the goods and services in the 
domestic country can be exchanged for the goods and services in another country,” has 
depreciated by seven-and-a-half percent relative to the eurozone.8 
This consequence of joining was not a surprise; Germany and other similar economies 
entered the union to cement their export advantages by preventing their main European 
competitors, especially France and Italy, from devaluing their currencies all while enjoying a 
relative devaluation themselves.  As a result, countries like Germany would be better able to 
continue growing their economy through export-led growth that is the result of increased 
competitiveness of domestically made products without having to worry about being ‘beaten’ by 
less competitive countries that used currency devaluation as a tool to sell goods at a lower price 
than the Germans abroad.  The extent to which less competitive countries used currency 
devaluation can be seen in the graph below, which demonstrates the exchange rate between the 
Italian lira (ITL) and the Deutschemark (DM) from 1980 to 1999:9    
 
                                                 
8 “Euro May Be Too Weak for Germany but Too Strong for Others.” 
9 “The Italian Lira: The Exchange Rate and Employment in the ERM | Bruegel,” accessed February 10, 2019, 
http://bruegel.org/2017/01/the-italian-lira-the-exchange-rate-and-employment-in-the-erm/. 
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While German businesses and mainstream political parties were expecting large benefits 
from euro membership for these reasons, the German public remained markedly less convinced: 
Eurobarometer polls based on fieldwork done in March and April 1997 indicated that 54 percent 
of Germans were against introduction of the euro with only 32 percent in favor, resulting in a 
hostile net unfavourability rating of 22 percent.10  Attachment to the deutschemark was very high 
in Germany, where great pride was derived from its stability and robustness.  The trauma caused 
by hyperinflation during the Weimar Republic was still relatively fresh when the modern 
Bundesbank was formed in 1957, which was one of the driving forces behind the bank’s charter 
heavily stressing the need to ‘safeguard’ the Deutschemark.11  The currency’s resulting strength 
and the public’s affinity for it made the DM often regarded as “a part of German post-World War 
II identity”.12  To increase support for the euro, the government had to undertake many public 
information campaigns that described the project currency as an extension of the deutschemark 
that would preserve the elements that made the German currency so ‘successful’, including a 
laser-focused commitment to price stability.13  As a result, by the eve of the euro’s introduction 
as an accounting currency on January 1, 1999, net support for the euro became positive with 54% 
of Germans approving; however, the German public continued to be more distrustful of the euro 
than the publics of other countries, as seen below:14  
                                                 
10 “Eurobarometer 47” (European Commission, October 1997), 28, 
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/eb/eb47/eb47_en.pdf. 
11 Craig R. Whitney, “Blaming the Bundesbank,” The New York Times, October 17, 1993, sec. Magazine, 
https://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/17/magazine/blaming-the-bundesbank.html. 
12 Elie Cohen, The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union, ed. Anthony Pagden, n.d., 285. 
13 Cohen, 285. 
14 “Eurobarometer 50” (Brussels: European Commission, March 1999), 70, 
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/eb/eb50/eb50_en.pdf. 
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This effect of euro-wariness was not as pronounced throughout the core: as seen in the 
Eurobarometer graph, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Belgium all had relatively high support 
for the introduction of the euro despite being part of the bloc of countries that runs current 
account surpluses.  There are many potential explanations for this phenomenon.  First, the three 
countries agreed to form a customs union and fixed exchange rate scheme called Benelux before 
the end of World War II and agreed to have free movement of goods, services, labor, and capital 
since 1960.15  This cooperation predating the eurozone meant that joining the eurozone was not 
these countries’ first exercise in transferring some sovereignty away from national 
decisionmakers.  As a result, it is likely that the idea was more palatable for the publics in these 
                                                 
15 “Benelux - The First Organisations and Cooperative Ventures in Post-War Europe,” accessed February 23, 2019, 
https://www.cvce.eu/en/education/unit-content/-/unit/026961fe-0d57-4314-a40a-a4ac066a1801/c28bd41d-7e26-
48bf-b9a6-1cce7cc5eb70. 
Ram 11 
countries.  In addition, all three countries are relatively small and had recent histories of invasion 
and loss of sovereignty, making it also likely that a desire to tie themselves economically and 
politically with their former aggressors to prevent history from repeating itself.   
However, these effects faded over time after the incorporation of the euro – in 2005, 
people in the Netherlands voted 61% to 39% to decisively reject Dutch ratification of the 
proposed European Constitution, a consolidation of existing treaties that also contained measures 
to achieve the following goals: (1) streamline decision making by allowing majority voting for 
justice and law enforcement issues instead of requiring unanimous agreement, (2) reallocate 
votes to give more to larger countries, (3) increase foreign policy and aid disbursement 
coordination, and (4) cede more power from countries to Brussels in matters of immigration and 
justice.16,17  In general, this result signaled Dutch voters’ resistance to relinquishing power to the 
EU; specifically, the public was concerned with allowing Brussels more control over 
immigration, allowing Turkey into the bloc, and wanted to protest a lack of economic growth 
(and slide from budgetary surplus to deficit) following the Netherlands joining the eurozone.18 
These same trends and justifications were enumerated by voters throughout the bloc.   
 
  
                                                 
16 “Dutch Join French in Rejecting EU Treaty,” Financial Times, June 1, 2005, 
https://www.ft.com/content/67e0cdb2-d2c0-11d9-bead-00000e2511c8. 
17 “EUROPEAN UNION: The French & Dutch Referendums,” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed February 25, 
2019, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/european-union-french-dutch-referendums. 
18 “EUROPEAN UNION.” 
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VINCOLO ESTERNO  
Peripheral countries, on the other hand, also benefitted from this arrangement even 
though traditionally their growth was inflation-led.  Their main benefit was that joining the euro 
allowed them to solve the problem of inflation and, as a result, dodge the side effects that come 
with high inflation such as higher cost of servicing debt, lowered export competitiveness, and 
declining real amounts of wealth and wages because of reduced purchasing power.  The graph 
below, produced using World Bank data, shows the extent to which some major periphery 
countries struggled with inflation:19
 
By joining the euro, these countries were able to protect their people from the negative 
effects of inflation—a major incentive to join.  As seen in the graph, the steady convergence and 
reduction of consumer price inflation has resulted.  Relatedly and importantly, the euro also gave 
these countries access to much cheaper financing and allowed them to issue euro-denominated 
debt, which removed a source of risk when compared with prior sovereign debt issuances.  Due 
                                                 
19 “Inflation, Consumer Prices (Annual %) | Data,” accessed February 13, 2019, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG. 
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to frequent devaluation (seen in the Italian lira’s value against the constant Deutschemark) and 
high inflation as shown in the preceding graph, the non-current-account-surplus countries 
previously had to compensate investors for both sovereign risk from monetary and fiscal policy.  
These countries would be able to issue debt in a cheaper way if monetary policy were out of their 
control because the single currency area prevents abrupt devaluations while the European Central 
Bank’s guidance maintains sustainable inflation.  In addition, by eliminating barriers to 
investment and allowing free movement of capital, these countries would benefit because more 
capital would flow to them due to the increased availability of higher-return investment 
opportunities characteristic of less-developed20 economies.  
 As such, at worst the euro was seen as a necessary evil.  Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, a former 
prime minister and president of Italy who is now one of the country’s senators-for-life, described 
the euro as a currency that should not exist but also praised its existence because without it Italy 
would be a “Paese in bancarotta”, or bankrupt country.21  Many Italian bureaucrats and members 
of the public shared this view when considering joining the euro—they had low confidence in 
the government’s ability to carry out responsible fiscal and monetary policy and looked forward 
to having deficit rules and other measures dictated to domestic politicians from Brussels.  Italian 
elites did not want to be left out of the project of European integration and also saw joining the 
euro as an opportunity to sidestep the partitocracy (meaning political parties controlled many 
aspects of life including unions, industry, the bureaucracy, private companies, etc.) in Italy at the 
time, which was a contributing factor to its profligate budgets and unreliable monetary policy.22   
                                                 
20 Relative to development levels of ‘core’ economies. 
21 “Quel vincolo esterno che ha salvato l’ Italia Draghi: ora tocca a noi - la Repubblica.it,” Archivio - la 
Repubblica.it, accessed February 10, 2019, 
http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2011/12/28/quel-vincolo-esterno-che-ha-salvato.html. 
22 Kenneth Dyson and Kevin Featherstone, “Italy and EMU as a ‘Vincolo Esterno’: Empowering the Technocrats, 
Transforming the State,” South European Society and Politics 1, no. 2 (June 1, 1996): 272–99, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13608749608539475. 
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As a result, the publics here had high levels of support for joining the euro, as seen in 
Eurobarometer polling in the fall of 1998 showed a massive 88% of the Italian public were for 
adopting the euro; more importantly, only 6% were against doing so, which the remaining being 
undecided.23  Finally, this arrangement was also beneficial for many politicians because it 
allowed for a period of more realistic fiscal and monetary policy and shifted some blame away 
from them and towards the EU for ‘tying their hands’ on yearly budgets.24  In short, most interest 
groups in Italy understood by the 1990s that the country’s fiscal and monetary policy needed 
reform; most agreed that to expediently accomplish this goal, outside assistance would be 
required.   
In addition, another more political motivation that bolstered support for the proposed 
economic and monetary union throughout the periphery, but particularly in France and Italy, was 
to wrest monetary control back from the Bundesbank. Eight years after the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods exchange rate scheme, the European Monetary System was introduced to 
stabilize exchange rate movements and thereby increase business and consumer confidence 
because of increased certainty regarding future relative values of goods in different European 
currencies.  This system was not founded with the Deutschemark as its centerpiece currency; in 
fact, a new accounting currency called the European Currency Unit was an economic-size-
weighted average of the national currencies that participated.  Each national currency had a fixed 
rate to the ECU and also had moving bilateral exchange rates that were required to remain within 
2.25% of what the fixed rate was.25  However, due to the DM’s large size weighting in the ECU 
                                                 
23 “Eurobarometer 50” (Brussels: European Commission, March 1999), 70, 
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/eb/eb50/eb50_en.pdf. 
24 Dyson and Featherstone, “Italy and EMU as a ‘Vincolo Esterno.’” 
25 Delivorias Angelos, “History of European Monetary Integration,” European Parliamentary Research Service, no. 
PE 551.325 (n.d.): 3. 
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basket and its aforementioned laser focus on low inflation, other countries had no choice but to 
lower inflation through high interest rates in order to maintain their access to the benefits of 
exchange rate stability and increased monetary integration.  In France, this policy was known as 
‘franc fort’ and began in earnest in the 1980s with support across the political spectrum.26   
At the initiation of this policy, countries experienced positive effects from bringing 
inflation under control due to the general economic expansion in Europe at the time that 
warranted tight monetary policy; however, as economic growth slowed in the early 1990s, 
Germany had to maintain tight monetary policy to counter the increased inflation occurring as a 
result of German reunification and other countries, once again, had to maintain high interest rates 
even though weaker economic conditions warranted low rates.27  France and other periphery 
countries continued to mirror this policy though it was not the most appropriate for their 
domestic economies in order to “hold their own” against the Deutschemark and keep integration 
alive.28  By moving towards the a common currency, countries would be able to avoid these 
issues and provide input on monetary policy decisions instead of being a passenger whose 
destiny was directed by Germany, all while marching towards the political goal of more 
European integration.  Unfortunately, as seen in the next section, the primacy of achieving this 
political goal created incomplete institutions that are unable to effectively govern the currency 
area.   
  
                                                 
26 Christian de Boissieu and Jean Pisani-Ferry, “The Political Economy of French Economic Policy and the 
Transition to EMU” (Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales, 1995), 29, 
http://www.cepii.fr/PDF_PUB/wp/1995/wp1995-09.pdf. 
27 de Boissieu and Pisani-Ferry, 30. 
28 Whitney, “Blaming the Bundesbank.” 
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INCOMPLETE TRIANGLE 
Many of the problems the eurozone faces today are the result of decisions made during 
the pre-crisis era concerning the composition of the bloc.  European integration as a whole is 
often depicted as the triangle shown below:29 
 
In this diagram, the arrows indicate the consensus view on how integration ought to proceed 
from the 1950s to present day. After France decided against further political and defense 
integration in 1954, further political integration could no longer be the primary method of 
meeting the primarily political goal of creating strong supranational institutions that prevent 
future large-scale conflicts and facilitate an era of European reconciliation.30  A potential 
explanation for this relatively widespread rejection of political consolidation is the forced 
subjugation that took place throughout continental Europe during World War II when much of 
the continent was living in either territory controlled by Nazi collaborator regimes or in directly 
                                                 
29 European Central Bank, “Economic and Monetary Union in Europe: Political Priority versus Economic 
Integration?,” European Central Bank, accessed March 22, 2019, 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2001/html/sp010223.en.html. 
30 Bank. 
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occupied territory.31  As a result, less than a decade later may have been too soon to entertain the 
idea of ceding any political sovereignty to external entities.  
Instead, economic integration, as seen in the Treaty of Rome (1957), was a more 
attractive first step because of the tangible increases in quality of life that the move was expected 
to bring.  Namely, these benefits are that the “removal of many different non-tariff barriers will 
compel [firms] to rethink their development strategies, to adapt to a new situation of increased 
competition, and to exploit the opportunities thus created”, with the ultimate beneficiaries of this 
move being consumers because “the elimination of the unproductive costs of non-Europe and the 
pressure of competition will bring prices down [and] the expansion of trade will increase both 
the quantity, quality, and choice of the goods and services at their disposal”.32  By starting with 
economic integration instead of political integration, countries would be able to maintain 
political sovereignty, increase their economic output sooner, and still move towards the ultimate 
political goal of increasing integration. 
Unfortunately, this implemented structure and proposed path forward of economic (and 
eventually monetary) integration before political integration is analogous to putting the cart 
before the horse.  Political integration, ideally, would come first to facilitate the creation of 
institutions that can handle complex issues such as how to: (1) transfer capital through 
coordinated budgets and fiscal unions, (2) handle asymmetric demand shocks and redistribute 
resources, and (3) create a regulatory framework that is robust enough to track multinational 
institutions like banks.33  The lack of these mechanisms has prompted some to argue that the 
                                                 
31 “Collaboration,” accessed March 23, 2019, https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/collaboration. 
32 Michael Emerson et al., “The Economics of 1992,” European Economy (Commission of the European 
Communities, March 1988), 151, http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/pages/publication7412_en.pdf. 
33 Erik Jones, R. Daniel Kelemen, and Sophie Meunier, “Failing Forward? The Euro Crisis and the Incomplete 
Nature of European Integration,” Comparative Political Studies 49, no. 7 (June 2016): 1010–34, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414015617966. 
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process of European economic integration entails manufactured crises.  Jones, Kelemen, and 
Meunier theorize that European economic integration “fails forward”, meaning that compromises 
between governments produce incomplete, “lowest common denominator” solutions to crises 
which do not adequately address longer-term issues.  Each compromise incrementally integrates 
the bloc further and solves the crisis but does not put into place preventative best economic 
practices because they seem unnecessary to domestic populations.  Then, once another crisis 
eventually arises as a result of this inadequate response, a new solution, now with sufficient 
support, is implemented narrowly to solve the new problem.34  In addition, the relatively short-
term nature of political tenures encourages politicians to heavily discount the future costs of their 
policies and magnify short-term costs.35  Incremental integration carries with it very large 
negative externalities that national politicians can dodge.  The eurozone cannot dodge these 
externalities—public trust in the eurozone to make them better off declines with every crisis.  In 
addition, the “perception that the EU is constantly in crisis” also undermines public support for 
further integration and reduces the legitimacy and credibility of the European Union inside and 
outside the bloc.36  
However, during the pre-crisis period, idealism dictated that small steps forward were 
better than standing in place.  This sentiment is best illustrated by Germany’s Chancellor Kohl, 
whose goals and ambitions for European integration before the negotiation of the Maastricht 
Treaty have not come to fruition. Kohl said repeatedly that progress towards political union was 
“a requirement for Germany’s agreement to EMU” and that “monetary and political union were 
                                                 
34 Jones, Kelemen, and Meunier. 
35 Jones, Kelemen, and Meunier. 
36 Jones, Kelemen, and Meunier, 1013. 
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not separable but were instead two sides of the same coin”.37  Eventually, these demands were 
compromised away based on the preferences of other states who feared German dominance in 
pursuit of the larger goal of achieving economic and monetary union.  A combination of hostile 
domestic reactions to political union, idealism, and a desire to meet ambitious goals resulted in 
the acceptance of compromises and the creation of a notably suboptimal currency area. 
 
EUROZONE VS. OPTIMAL CURRENCY AREA 
In theory, common currency areas should make their constituent countries better off or 
provide some advantage; if not, there is no incentive to join in the first place or to remain.  
Robert Mundell, a Nobel-prize-winning economist, pioneered the idea of an optimal currency 
area; since then, McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969) have also contributed to create a 
framework for ideal currency areas, summarized by Frankel and Rose as “(1) the degree of labor 
mobility; (2) the similarity of shocks and cycles; (3) the extent of trade; and (4) the system of 
risk-sharing, usually through fiscal transfers” such that “the greater any of the four linkages 
between the countries, the more suitable a common currency”.38  In this section, each of these 
criteria will be explored in greater detail and the current state of the European Economic and 
Monetary Union will be compared against this framework. 
Mundell wrote that the main criterion for dividing the world into currency areas should 
be based on factor mobility such that factors of production (e.g. labor and capital) are sufficiently 
                                                 
37 Michael J. Baun, “The Maastricht Treaty as High Politics: Germany, France, and European Integration,” Political 
Science Quarterly 110, no. 4 (1995): 621, https://doi.org/10.2307/2151886. 
38 Jeffrey Frankel and Andrew Rose, “The Endogeneity of the Optimum Currency Area Criteria” (Cambridge, MA: 
National Bureau of Economic Research, August 1996), https://doi.org/10.3386/w5700. 
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mobile within currency areas and sufficiently immobile across them.39  These factors of 
production, if allowed to freely flow within currency areas, should result in a more optimal 
utilization of factors of production. Through basic supply and demand, a larger labor pool can 
more efficiently fill the demand for labor across a larger area instead of remaining sub-optimally 
allocated on a national level.  This same effect should also be observable through capital 
investment, which will have more opportunities to fund projects with higher return and result in 
greater welfare overall as capital becomes more efficiently allocated.   
In theory, the European single market provides for this because of its requirement that 
freedom of movement must exist for goods, services, capital, and people within the entire 
European Union and not just the eurozone.40   In practice, factors of production have been more 
mobile across the bloc than goods and goods have been much more mobile than services.  The 
service sector, which constitutes seventy percent of the EU gross domestic product, only 
accounted for twenty percent of trade within the EU in 2012.41  Reasons for this large disparity 
include protectionist professional licensing, country-specific training regimes, and other hurdles 
that prevent service providers from effectively competing.42  A meta-analysis conducted by the 
European Parliament Research Service in 2014 found that current barriers to free movement of 
goods include regulations on foreign direct investment, non-tariff trade barriers, home bias, 
public procurement rules, and country-specific delays in harmonization of regulations.43 
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Such roadblocks can prevent things like machines from consistently being used for the 
most value-creating opportunities.  In addition to these more theoretical issues, very real 
problems exist for workers who seek to move between member states.  These challenges include 
difficulty in finding employment abroad, implicit discrimination against foreign workers, 
difficulty in conveying and relating past experiences and competencies, uncertainty regarding 
social security and welfare programs across borders, differences in taxation regimes, and most 
importantly inability to speak the local language.  On a macro level, countries have a vested 
interest in maintaining some of these roadblocks. The existence of large income and wage gaps 
between labor-destination and labor-providing countries makes it impossible to bear the cost of 
maintaining strong welfare states, deep economic integration, and social protections, as 
summarized in the graphic below:44 
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As a result, labor is not sufficiently mobile, meaning that the current eurozone structure does not 
satisfy the first, most important requirement of an optimum currency area, which is free 
movement of factors of production. 
In addition, theory dictates that countries within the currency area should have correlated 
business cycles.45  Without correlated business cycles, countries will be more prone to 
asymmetric economic shocks and will be less able to handle them due to a lack of control over 
monetary policy.   Giannone, Lenza, and Reichlin found from meta-analysis that (1) the timing of 
aggregate euro area recessions is similar to the occurrence of US recessions with the euro area 
turning point being after the US; (2) a regional component explains around 30% of European 
national business cycles and output growth differentials in countries from 1990-2007 are small 
but persistent; and (3) that there is no clear consensus on the emergence of increased correlation 
among euro countries with equal number of robust studies reaching opposite conclusions.46  
Their own model shows that euro area business cycles have not changed in a meaningful way 
since the introduction of the Economic and Monetary Union because the core countries that have 
historically had synchronized business cycles continued to do so and the periphery, which has 
had historically more volatile and heterogeneous business cycles, continued to do so after the 
introduction of the euro.47  In addition, the common currency has resulted in greater industrial 
specialization due to increased trade, making regions of the eurozone more vulnerable to 
asymmetric shocks such as, for example, a threat to car production in Germany.48  The loss of 
control over monetary policy, as a result, did not lessen the probability of asymmetric shocks 
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while removing a method of handling these shocks.  The lack of similarity and volatility of 
business cycles between the core and periphery suggests per optimum currency theory that the 
two should not be part of the same currency union.   
Optimum currency area theory also realizes that regardless of business cycle 
synchronization, some shocks will always be asymmetric.  To that end, the theory suggests that 
systems of risk-sharing will allow the currency area to be successful and neutralize the inevitable 
asymmetric events that occur over the long term.  Without monetary policy control, a higher 
magnitude of fiscal policy changes will be required to absorb asymmetric shocks.  As a result, 
different crises will see different countries requiring more assistance to cover the budget deficits 
caused by the required fiscal policy.  Current fiscal risk-sharing mechanisms within the EMU are 
as follows: (1) the European Stability Mechanism, whose conditional sovereign lending facility 
provides cheap loans to struggling countries with strong conditionality and strict repayment 
schedules and acts as a lender of last resort, and (2) the EU budget, which is wholly ineffective 
because its budget is capped at around 1% of European GDP (in comparison to Canada, 
Switzerland, and the US, whose federal budgets average about 15-20% of GDP).49  This aversion 
to risk sharing is enshrined in the now infamous no-bailout clause found in the Maastricht Treaty, 
the founding document of the European Union that created the euro currency.  It was also 
reiterated in Lisbon Treaty, which revised many parts of Maastricht.  The clause stated that:  
the Union shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments, 
regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public 
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undertakings of any Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for 
the joint execution of a specific project. A Member State shall not be liable for or assume 
the commitments of central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other 
bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of another Member State, without 
prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project.50   
Though bailouts have been approved during times of immediate crisis, the lack of an existing 
transfer mechanism ensures that asymmetric shocks will continue to affect the bloc and that the 
bloc is unqualified to appropriately handle them.  
Though optimal currency area theory provides a useful set of yardsticks by which to 
evaluate the Economic and Monetary Union, its applicability and accuracy have been the subject 
of criticism.  Some of its criteria are endogenous; in other words, being part of a currency area 
makes being part of a currency area better, meaning that the theory may not have predictive 
power to identify good candidates for a currency area.  For example, though historical data may 
suggest that some countries have business cycles that are too asynchronous, the greater 
integration from currency area membership will synchronize cycles and result in the currency 
area becoming optimal ex post facto.51 However, the Lucas critique, which argues that historical 
data cannot be used to predict effects of economic decisions, does not apply here because after-
the-fact data is being used.  Other criticisms of optimal currency area theory are that it 
underestimates common currency advantages, does not consider changes of behavior contingent 
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upon the currency area’s creation, and does not account for speculative exchange rate 
pressures.52 
 Despite these criticisms, optimal currency area theory from the 1960s is able to highlight 
the incompleteness in the pre-crisis era eurozone framework.  The creational period of the euro 
was characterized by an implicit agreement with Germany and its fellow export-oriented 
economies on one side and other eurozone countries (including France, Italy, and the periphery) 
on the other.  Both blocs had something to gain through association in the European Union and, 
as such, were willing to compromise and make gradual adjustments.  As discussed in this paper, 
the combined group of the two blocs do not meet any of the criteria required for an optimal 
currency area, having disparate economic conditions and business cycles, a lack of sufficient 
mobility of goods and labor, and no system of fiscal transfers.  This incomplete system can be 
thought of as a loop that is by design not circuitous because no system to redistribute wealth 
exists.  This fundamental underlying flaw and its effects will be observed more thoroughly in the 
next section. Unfortunately, these shortcomings would bring the eurozone to the brink during the 
European sovereign debt crisis.  Without a fundamental restructuring, the current incomplete 
structure cannot be sustainable in the long run.  
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"Almost every achievement contains within its success the seeds of a future problem."  
– James A. Baker III 
SECTION II: CRISIS 
BACKGROUND 
 Over the past decade, this currency area has suffered through two distinct crises that 
exposed many of its shortcomings.  This section will highlight the events that occurred during 
the two crises by providing economic justification for events that took place, discussing the 
institutional issues that manufactured the sovereign debt crisis, and analyzing the misdiagnoses 
of conventional economists. 
 The first crisis began in the United States in 2007 and, according to the U.S. Financial 
Crisis Inquiry Commission, was caused by “widespread failures in financial regulation, including 
the Federal Reserve’s failure to stem the tide of toxic mortgages; dramatic breakdowns in 
corporate governance including too many financial firms acting recklessly and taking on too 
much risk; an explosive mix of excessive borrowing and risk by households and Wall Street that 
put the financial system on a collision course with crisis; key policy makers ill prepared for the 
crisis, lacking a full understanding of the financial system they oversaw; and systemic breaches 
in accountability and ethics at all levels”.53  This crisis spread to Europe as the asset-backed 
securities and other American debt instruments European banks had bought began to default.  
Because of the rapid increase in debt default risk and incidence, European banks and other debt-
holding institutions began to see the value of their assets fall, which greatly reduced liquidity and 
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often brought their solvency into question.  In addition, the lack of short-term funds was 
exacerbated because of American banks’ unwillingness to provide capital due to a lack of 
confidence.  As a result, many states began to guarantee bank deposits and take other measures 
to rescue their banks from failing and prevent bank runs.54,55  
As countries began to use direct measures such as equity and capital injections, guarantee 
of deposits, and even outright nationalization to support their banks, they added to their public 
debt.  The addition of this debt increased the debt-to-GDP ratios of many member states which 
incrementally increased country default risk.  Because country default risk is a component in 
pricing sovereign bond interest rates, periphery eurozone countries saw the costs to service their 
debt increase and a corresponding decrease in their bonds’ value.  Unfortunately, because the 
banks in Europe were often major creditors for the countries they were based in, this decrease in 
sovereign bond value exacerbated the decrease in the asset value of that country’s banks.56   In 
this situation, though the non-sovereign bad debt the bank held may now be guaranteed, the 
fundamental problem of potential insolvency of domestic banks is unsolved because of risk 
transference to the government, which is reflected by riskier sovereign bonds that are held by 
domestic banks.    
In addition to the negative implications for domestic banks, businesses in the eurozone’s 
periphery also suffered dramatically.  The decade leading up to the crisis was characterized by 
cheap, easy credit access, meaning that investment into these countries was pouring in to raise 
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asset prices and fund projects. Once the crisis began, businesses in Europe, which rely more 
heavily on bank loans for funding than American businesses, were unable to grow and stimulate 
lagging domestic economies.57  As a result, inflation, wages, and asset prices which had 
increased precipitously over the  five years leading up to the crisis were exposed as overvalued.58  
Also, the prior increase in these capital inflows combined with an uncompetitive domestic 
economy resulted in an expanding current account deficit and reduced domestic demand.  An 
increased focus on credit risk, decreased risk appetite, and lack of liquidity on international 
markets as a result of the financial crisis made it much harder for these countries to continue to 
fund growth and development through low-interest debt as they had done before.  The end of 
capital inflows also highlighted the excessive reliance of periphery countries on investment from 
the core.  Without inflows, the periphery found it difficult to borrow to fund new projects, close 
their budgets, and even make the interest payments on their existing debt.  
Such a result has been forecasted for some time; from the inception of the euro in 1999, 
academics have warned about the vulnerability of the eurozone to asymmetric shocks.  In 1998, 
Barry James wrote: 
During the 20-year struggle for economic convergence in Europe, countries have on 
occasion fallen out of synchronization with the rest. Governments adjusted to the 
problem primarily by juggling exchange rates. A lower rate of exchange makes a country 
artificially, and usually only temporarily, more competitive. But exchange rates within the 
single currency area have been effectively locked into place since May, and come Jan. 1, 
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there will be no possibilities for rate adjustments among the 11 because all their 
currencies will then become units of the euro. The European Central Bank in Frankfurt 
will be responsible for establishing exchange rates with countries outside the euro zone.59   
Because monetary policy controlled by the ECB, it can no longer be used granularly as a 
‘pressure-release mechanism’ by individual countries to maintain stability and a semblance of 
parity between economies.  The eurozone-wide monetary policy instead is only able to deal with 
symmetric economic shocks that affect the entire eurozone.  As a result, the only tool countries 
have at their disposal is to change their fiscal policy to affect domestic inflation.  If domestic 
inflation is less than foreign inflation, then a depreciation in the real exchange rate between one 
eurozone country and the rest of the bloc will result, as shown by the equation below (eR is the 
real exchange rate)60: 
 
This equation suggests that eurozone periphery countries that have struggled with 
competitiveness and current account deficits need an internal devaluation to increase their 
competitiveness.  This target can be achieved by lowering periphery inflation such that it is 
below inflation in the eurozone core or by increasing inflation in the core to overtake the 
periphery.  Core countries, however, implicitly and explicitly blame the periphery for the crisis 
and have made austerity, meaning a reduction of structural deficits through increasing tax 
revenues and/or decreasing expenditures, a codified requirement of the European Stability and 
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Growth Pact.  Creditor institutions have pushed for austerity being a condition of bailout loans 
provided to the periphery countries.61  
 As such, many periphery countries drastically cut wages, etc. to reach these targets, 
which had a further dampening effect on economic activity; unfortunately, this also resulted in a 
reduction in tax revenue due to tax revenue being a function of economic activity.  In Spain, the 
imposition of such policies resulted in an average wage decrease of 22% in spite of the well-
documented existence of wage rigidity, or an unwillingness to cut wages, throughout Europe and 
the developed world.62,63 Often accompanied by increases in inequality, such wage decreases and 
cuts in social programs result in an increased demand to provide services for citizens, especially 
in the context of the European social welfare model.  Due to a combination of these factors, 
relative devaluation has failed to lift countries out of crisis despite its ability to marginally 
increase competitiveness through competitive relative deflation.64  Programs that facilitate 
relative devaluation are austerity-based; later on, this section explores in further detail the 
negative effects of austerity and why it does not work.  
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“Ten years into its existence, the euro is a resounding success. The euro area has developed a 
sound structure of economic governance.” 
  – EMU@10 Annual Report, 2008 65 
FRAIL AND FALSE SECURITY 
 As discussed extensively in the previous section, the main motivation for the creation of 
the EMU was because of political goals held by the two blocs of the eurozone.  Though these 
goals were different, enough overlap existed for compromises, resulting in a compromised 
institutional framework that cherrypicked favorable ideas agreeable to both parties while in many 
cases declining to simultaneously implement the backbone required to sustainably ensure the 
stability of the currency project.  Before the onset of the crisis, the prevailing consensus in both 
Frankfurt and Brussels was that the eurozone’s institutions were sufficient as is, as seen in this 
subsection’s opening quote.  This belief was based on the following premises: (1) flexible 
markets for labor and goods can neutralize asymmetric shocks, (2) the Stability and Growth 
Pact’s three percent deviation from a balanced budget is enough slack in case stimulus is needed 
during crisis, and (3) a central bank needs only to focus on price stability.66   
 This hands-off approach to governance was based on monetarism, an economic theory 
that contends that in long-run monetary neutrality, price levels will increase by the same amount 
as the money supply is increased.67  If this relationship holds, then it makes sense for a central 
bank to focus exclusively on price stability. It also then implies that monetary policy’s role in 
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managing economies ought to be much greater than fiscal policy’s because monetary policy has 
a direct impact on money stock.  As such, the eurozone’s focus on centralized monetary policy 
and devolved fiscal policy makes sense within the framework of monetarism because monetary 
policy is presumed to be the ultimate lever. In addition, the ECB’s focus on price stability was 
initially centered around a 4.5% growth rate of M3, which is a measure of money supply.68 Vítor 
Constâncio, the vice president of the ECB, noted that “the reference value for the monetary 
aggregate M3 was considered a relevant variable for inflation assessment and was related to the 
theoretical approach of technical monetarism in that money predicts inflation” but this method 
was eventually removed from the forefront because erratic changes in the money supply did not 
result in erratic inflation.69  The large money supply increase in July 2008 suggested to 
policymakers that an interest rate hike was warranted even through rates were being cut across 
the rest of the Western world.70 
As a result, the ECB changed its focus directly to maintaining inflation targets and 
dropped references to money supply modulation; however, the guidelines that created it still 
presuppose a monetaristic high level of efficiency in markets that self-ensures financial stability.  
In addition, the founding belief of business cycles being based on structural changes that central 
banks cannot change justified a narrow operating charter for the ECB to focus exclusively on 
price stability.  In reality, it is now known that many factors within the realm of central banks 
influence business cycle and influence markets; as a result, price stability cannot be the only 
focus for a modern central bank that desires consistent, healthy growth and a stable 
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macroeconomic landscape.  Price-stability-focused policy is also not a panacea due to the 
undisputable existence of animal spirits, bubbles, and market inefficiencies which do not 
immediately manifest in price distortions but nevertheless require consideration when making 
interest rate decisions to maximize financial stability and well-being. 
 Once again in the words of Vítor Constâncio, “the institutional set-up of Monetary Union 
left financial stability considerations largely unaddressed” because of its “minimalist design 
which left economic and financial policies mostly at national level” based on an unjustified faith 
in the efficiency of capital markets in a world with liberal capital flows.71  Financial integration 
in private markets, which occurs when debt and equity from one country is held by investors in 
another, is an effective form of risk sharing that reduces the incidence and severity of asymmetric 
shocks.  Having this integration is important because the current structure of the eurozone does 
not allow for the resolution of asymmetric shocks due to a one-size-fits-all monetary policy, rules 
restricting national fiscal policy, and staggering national debt loads across the bloc.  Increased 
financial integration makes consumption and income less linked on the national level, meaning 
that citizens and institutions of one country are not tied as strongly to the economic performance 
of their country because they receive returns from other countries that are not suffering from the 
same shock.  In addition, financial integration increases buy-in across the union; in other words, 
German investors have incentives to encourage their government to take measures to help worse-
performing countries like Italy because of the investors’ stake in Italian markets.  Increased 
integration also provides more financing opportunities and lower financing costs.  Unfortunately, 
on the eve of the crisis, this integration was barely sufficient; at its onset, most progress reversed 
                                                 
71 European Central Bank, “Why EMU Requires More Financial Integration,” European Central Bank, accessed 
April 6, 2019, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2018/html/ecb.sp180503_1.en.html. 
Ram 34 
and “almost all financial markets became highly fragmented and retrenched inside domestic 
borders”.72  Reasons for fragmentation include national supervision of capital markets and 
country-specific financial stability risks.73 
 In addition, banking integration was lacking before the onset of the crisis. The narrowly 
defined roles of the ECB and devolution of supervision to national governments meant that 
banks in different countries followed different rules and standards; as a result, banking 
integration was limited. Consequently, the concentration of risk in the banks of a few countries 
helped strengthen the bank-sovereign negative feedback loop and cause spillovers from bank 
failures that pushed sovereigns into crisis.74  The difference in regulatory requirements helped 
contribute to large discrepancies in non-performing loans as a percent of total loans across the 
bloc as seen by the graph below (note: Core is AUT, BEL, FRA, and NLD): 
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Furthermore, the increased compliance and regulatory burden of complying with differing 
regulations meant local banks lent mostly to local companies.  When local economies suffered, 
local banks failed which further negatively affected the economy of their country. By increasing 
cross-border banking, banks can weather asymmetric shocks better by having more diverse 
lending options.   
Another problem pre-crisis was the lack of guidelines on what to do when banks did 
default. Before the crisis, a large bank defaulting meant that the country where it was based had 
to bail the bank out and arrange on a national level to ensure that retail banking deposits were 
protected in case of default.  For a country with weaker institutions and a larger debt load, a 
large, local shock can undermine depositors’ confidence in the national banking system and 
investors’ confidence in the country’s ability to ever repay its debt.75  In addition, the lack of 
common guidelines and insurance in case of default can discourage banks from beginning cross-
border operations in ‘riskier’ countries that suffer from less overall confidence in the robustness 
of their deposit insurance scheme.  The lack of guidelines, procedures, and institutions to handle 
defaults contributed to fragmentation along national lines and reduced lending in the periphery, 
which was where it was needed most during the crisis. 
Even more damaging to the eurozone’s credibility and economic strength was austerity. 
As the sovereign debt crisis began in Europe, a fundamental misunderstanding of its causes led 
to the consensus view that austerity was the answer.  Austerity increased economic hardship, 
slowed growth, lowered quality of life, and helped engineer a lost decade for Europe.76  
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 “In combating economic problems, the eurozone has twice in the past decade shown an uncanny 
ability to rely on the wrong tool for the job.”  
–Financial Times Editorial Board, March 2019 
AUSTERITY 
According to Mark Blyth, austerity is a “form of voluntary deflation in which the 
economy adjusts through the reduction of wages, prices, and public spending in order to restore 
competitiveness which is (supposedly) best achieved by cutting the state’s budget, debts, and 
deficits” to “inspire business confidence” and therefore catalyze growth.77  Unfortunately, these 
effects rarely materialize.  Many international institutions such as the International Monetary 
Fund that have strongly advocated for austerity as a condition of provided bailout assistance in 
the past have changed course and admitted that austerity can have devasting economic effects.78  
Without a doubt, austerity did not work in the countries that suffered through the European 
sovereign debt crisis.   
In the EU periphery, austerity was imposed on countries in two forms: through 
conditionality attached to troika (European Commission, European Central Bank, and the 
International Monetary Fund) assistance measures and through the EU’s Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP), which limited budget deficits to 3% of GDP.79  In the case of Ireland, for example, 
the state was on good financial footing until tax revenues decreased by more than thirty percent 
from 2007 to 2010 due to worldwide recession.  The country had to embark on a regressive 
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mission of spending cuts in welfare programs, national healthcare, public education, and other 
forms of capital investment on top of tax raises and a privatization wave.80  These measures have 
combined to increase inequality in Ireland due to reduction in the social safety net and increases 
in value added taxes, which disproportionally impact those with lower incomes. Austerity 
policies cripple economies because of their negative effect on demand across the economy: by 
increasing taxation, less spending takes place which decreases the rate of economic recovery.  In 
addition, decreasing public sector spending results in a further slowing of economic growth and 
compounds with decreased consumer spending to have a de-stimulating effect on the economy.  
This negative economic effect can be seen in the following graph, which shows the correlation 
between the change in employment rate and structural balance (higher value meaning more 
austerity) between the years 2010 to 2014:81  
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During the crisis, however, the core led by German Chancellor Angela Merkel and her 
finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble continued to push for austerity (often relabeled as ‘structural 
reform’).  In 2011, Schäuble wrote an op-ed in the Financial Times: 
…it is an undisputable fact that excessive state spending has led to unsustainable levels of 
debt and deficits... The recipe is as simple as it is hard to implement in practice: 
…countries faced with high levels of debt and deficits need to cut expenditures, increase 
revenues, and remove the structural hindrances in their economies… There is some 
concern that [these actions] could undermine demand in these countries in the short term.  
I am not convinced that this is a foregone conclusion, but even if it were, there is a trade-
off between short-term pain and long-term gain… The eurozone crisis unfolded after a 
decade during which economies with markedly different, and indeed, diverging fiscal 
profiles and competitiveness were all able to borrow at close to benchmark rates.  Hence 
my unease when some politicians and economists call on the eurozone to take a sudden 
leap into fiscal union and joint liability… Such a step…could make [the crisis] worse in 
the medium term by removing a key incentive for the weaker members to forge ahead 
with much-needed reforms.82  
To comply with this school of thought, Italy’s stimulus measures included 
counterbalancing revenue-generating provisions that closed loopholes, provided a one-time tax 
holiday to repatriate capital without tax evasion charges (a.k.a. extraordinary tax), and offered a 
substitute asset reevaluation tax after the beginning of the economic slowdown in 2008.83  The 
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majority of this revenue was voluntary and non-repeating in nature, with parliamentary hearings 
on the budget reflecting “the difficulty of reducing expenditures” and “the lack of flexibility of 
the budget”.84  A combination of Italy’s inability and unwillingness to meaningfully cut 
expenditures resulted in the country being forced to agree to cut expenditures by 47 million euros 
and raise taxes for its next budget in 2011 despite anemic growth and persistently elevated 
unemployment rates.85 Anger and frustration in Italy due to the government’s management of the 
financial crisis resulted in the resignation of Prime Minister Berlusconi and the inauguration of a 
technocratic government less than a month after the same took place in Greece.86 
 Popular dissatisfaction is understandable given that the internal devaluation that results 
from austerity-based fiscal policy is disastrous and jarring.  The goal of the policy is to restore 
lost competitiveness through the reduction of wages and prices and to improve budget forecasts 
by increasing revenues and decreasing expenditures.  Reductions in wages come with 
corresponding decreases in standards of living and increased burden on social safety nets which 
become less able to handle the additional stress due to funding cuts.  Reduction in public 
spending and increase in taxation also have a recessionary effect that has the potential to become 
a runaway problem when combined with the effect of wage reductions.  To suggest the 
implementation of these policies in countries that are on the brink of recession anyway is unwise 
because the decrease in aggregate demand will be sure to dig countries deeper into stagnation 
and make the prospect of returning to growth more difficult.  
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BLAME, BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE 
 Austerity is an especially bad idea during times of economic stagnation – the basis of this 
understanding was not discovered in the few years that have passed since the worst of the debt 
crisis.   Countries did not choose to implement austerity and continue to do so after seeing its 
undesirable effects for masochistic reasons; rather, austerity was a last resort.  An unfortunate 
interconnected event before the onset of austerity was the Great Recession, which greatly 
reduced investors’ risk appetites and began the trend of decreasing liquidity and demand for 
‘riskier’ sovereign debt.  As a result, it became prohibitively expensive for countries to issue debt 
when funding was needed most because of: (1) less appetite for sovereign debt, (2) the need to 
issue sovereign debt to both service existing debt and nationalize large amounts of private debt, 
(3) negative growth, and (4) a long recurring trend of yearly budget deficits. A combination of 
these factors created an environment where concerns of creditworthiness increased.  As a result, 
the interest rates of countries with creditworthiness concerns began to diverge from German 
bond rates, as seen below:87  
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As such, while much of Germany’s influence on the eurozone’s construction and its 
reaction to crises doubtlessly made recovery more difficult, the blame for austerity does not lie 
solely on it.  The blame also lies with private lenders who demanded sky-high interest rates to 
hold debt or, even worse, were not interested in buying any debt at all. Private lenders 
collectively choosing not to finance more borrowing in periphery countries made it impossible 
for crisis-stricken countries to tap the financial markets for funding, making them “functionally 
insolvent” due to an inability to borrow money at expected rates to meet immediate obligations 
like public sector payrolls and funding for social programs.88  Regardless of the terms of the 
troika at large or of any one country, the only sustainable solution to regain prior access to 
borrowing is to demonstrate to the market that confidence in the sold debt instrument is 
warranted; other financing solutions like bailouts cannot plug this gap in an ongoing basis and 
the availability of these solutions in the middle of a liquidity crisis cannot be guaranteed.  
 Unfortunately, countries as a result found themselves needing to reduce the costs to 
service their existing debt and issue cheap new debt to try sparking their moribund economies 
while running the risk that these tactics will make recession more intense and long-lasting. 
Solving one problem makes the other worse as seen earlier in Ireland, where austerity policies 
begat more austerity policies. Trying to placate bondholders and international creditor 
institutions by implementing austerity to inspire confidence in their ‘fiscal discipline’ makes for a 
weaker economy and less commercial activity to tax, making it less likely that fiscal discipline 
will be demonstrated.  As a result, the initial goal of wooing investors is unsolved if undertaken 
in inopportune economic times.  Ultimately, blame does not even rest solely with investors – 
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following the subprime mortgage crisis’s contagion to the broader world economy and the 
explosion of sovereign debt, increased creditor reluctance is warranted.  A perfect storm of 
preceding events combined with the wrong response of austerity at the wrong economic time 
made the crisis more painful and longer than needed.  The blame does not rest solely on any one 
creditor group.  
WHO’S PAYING? 
 In the discussion of creditor groups, one is conspicuously absent: the European Central 
Bank.  Countries with their own currencies like the UK have immunity from credibility concerns 
that flared up during the sovereign debt crisis because they can always guarantee they will have 
enough pound sterling to repay any debt.  This is because they control the production of their 
own currency.  In contrast, much like emerging economies that issue debt in US dollars, 
eurozone countries cannot guarantee they will have enough euros on hand to distribute to 
bondholders and may be unable to access needed funding during crises.89  This uncertainty exists 
because there is no euro-area treasury that would be able to guarantee the repayment of debts 
accumulated by euro-using countries due to the no bailout clause found in the Maastricht Treaty. 
This clause has been reaffirmed by Germany and other countries in the years since. Individual 
domestic central banks can no longer serve this guarantee and act as a lender of last resort 
because of limited euro reserves and no ability to unilaterally create more euros.  Because the 
ECB had also declined to take on this responsibility at the onset of the crisis, there is no 
guarantee backstopping sovereign bonds in the eurozone meaning that any crisis can quickly turn 
into a liquidity and solvency crisis especially if exacerbated by bank runs.  
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The justification for avoiding the classification of the European Central Bank as a lender 
of last resort is the same one used to minimize mutual responsibility for individual state fiscal 
policy: the desire to prevent moral hazard and the subsidization of bad fiscal decision-making by 
other euro-area taxpayers.  The Bundesbank, in whose image the ECB was made, “never even 
acknowledged its role as a lender of last resort” for its own German currency due to “notorious 
moral hazard fears dominating any other concerns” and a distrust of how politicians might 
change German fiscal policy if this information were well-known.90   The goal of this policy is to 
provide yet another incentive for governments to lower fiscal deficits and debt burdens by 
serving as a deterrent and preventing the risk by making it clear that relief will not be given. 
Across the spectrum, academics argued that such risk-seeking behavior can be discouraged 
through supervisory mechanisms instead of rejecting one of the roles of a central bank.91   
The ECB’s problematic, misguided decision to refrain from conducting market 
operations to support government bonds catalyzed the beginning of the debt crisis by signaling 
the central bank’s reluctance to intervene.  As a result, government bond prices fell precipitously 
in many periphery countries, leading to value loss for debtholders, which were usually domestic 
banks.  The resulting consumer rushes on banks forced the ECB’s hand and they began lending 
money to banks to buy government bonds.92  Unfortunately, this policy was also problematic and 
misguided because it provided a perverse incentive for domestic banks to leverage up even 
further through increased purchases of risky sovereign debt after receiving funds from the ECB 
at rock-bottom rates.93  Banks became more vulnerable to solvency risk of their country’s 
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national debt, providing a bigger headache for national decisionmakers because the unhealthy 
bank-sovereign loop became drawn tighter.  Though the ECB’s silence and initial poor policy 
spoke volumes during the early period of the crisis, the actions it eventually took kept the euro 
area intact.  These actions will be evaluated in the next section. 
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“If you owe your bank a hundred pounds, you have a problem.  But if you owe a million, it has.” 
– John Maynard Keynes 
SECTION III: POST-CRISIS 
EVALUATING EMERGENCY MEASURES 
   Many changes to the eurozone’s structure instituted during the crisis helped countries 
weather the worst of the crisis and further integrated the bloc.  This subsection will evaluate the 
effectiveness of these crisis measures in increasing eurozone integration and consider the impacts 
of these measures on the sustainability of the European Economic and Monetary Union.  At the 
onset of the crisis, the ECB undertook many temporary measures that culminated in the 
European Stability Mechanism, which is the eurozone’s permanent bailout fund that issues 
highly-rated, cheap bonds to provide up to 500 billion euros of assistance based on capital 
collateral from eurozone governments.94  The mechanism avoided direct fiscal transfers between 
states, instead transferring risk to the bond markets; however, in the case of the crisis-stricken 
country being unable to repay the ESM bonds, the capital from other countries will be used to 
repay creditors.  This mechanism allows for the ‘letter of the law’ to continue upholding the no-
bailout clause while implicitly acknowledging the inevitableness of more euro-area risk sharing. 
In addition, the ECB’s announced-but-never-used program of Outright Monetary Transactions 
has the ability to purchase one to three-year sovereign bonds in secondary markets to push down 
a country’s yields if in the midst of a bailout.95  Though this program was never used, its 
implementation greatly increased confidence in the existing debt of sovereign countries by 
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committing the ECB to purchasing debt and being a ‘buyer of last resort’ of sorts.96  Both of 
these measures are strictly conditional upon “the implementation of macroeconomic reform 
programs prepared by the European Commission, in liaison with the European Central Bank and, 
where appropriate, the International Monetary Fund”.97  Throughout the crisis, these reform 
programs that were prepared by the troika were austerity-based.  As discussed in the section on 
austerity, countries that followed austerity policies became worse off as a result because the 
corresponding fall in output was larger than any fall in debt. The consensus view among 
creditors, a group composed of both private institutions and states like Germany, was that “the 
crisis was the outcome of a lack of discipline on the part of other governments”.98 
 Two important actions taken by the ECB which are even further removed from fiscal 
transfers are the use of negative deposit rates and the long-term refinancing operation (LTRO).  
The LTRO provided very low interest rate loans to banks in the eurozone in order to increase 
liquidity in the European banking system and encourage the purchase of sovereign bonds by 
banks but offered a perverse incentive to strengthen the bank-sovereign feedback loop by 
encouraging national banks to buy their country’s sovereign debt. Central banks in the rest of the 
developed world relied largely on quantitative easing (QE) starting in 2008 but the ECB waited 
until 2015 to begin QE due to moral hazard concerns and a desire to maintain compliance with 
the no-bailout clause.99 In addition, the ECB’s Bundesbank-esque laser focus on inflation 
prevention led to premature interest rate hikes and deep discomfort with prolonged periods of 
low rates in any case.  This behavior caused a premature rate hike in 2011 that worsened the 
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upcoming crisis.100  The aversion to inflation resulted in the ECB’s descent into negative interest 
rates being implemented poorly. By the end of 2008, the Fed had lowered the interest rate to near 
zero and promised to buy one trillion dollars’ worth of debt; at this time, interest rates in the 
eurozone were still at 2.5% and no quantitative easing measures were announced.101  The ECB’s 
crisis response was characterized by delayed reactions, unease with any level of risk-sharing, the 
use of complex workarounds based on disproven economic theories that worsened crisis effects, 
and moralism that was used to justify the increased suffering of the periphery due to imposed 
bailout conditions.  The resulting arbitrary rules made recovery and response more difficult than 
necessary. 
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“The eurozone is in a period of continued weakness and pervasive uncertainty.” 
–Mario Draghi, March 2019 
WHERE ARE WE NOW? 
More than ten years after the financial crisis, interest rates in the eurozone are still 
negative even as global economic headwinds are increasing rapidly.102  In March 2019, many 
central banks postponed interest rate hikes as a result.  A rate hike was never under consideration 
in the eurozone despite rates still being at crisis level lows.  Because it is not possible to pause 
unscheduled rate hikes, the ECB chose to restart the crisis-era LTRO program, which offers 
below-cost loans to eurozone banks to prevent another collapse in lending.103 Due to current 
negative rates, ECB will not be able to meaningfully stimulate economic activity by lowering 
interest rates in the event of a crisis in the near future.  The bloc’s purchase of assets continued 
until December 2018 and the ECB’s balance sheet remains swollen.  Unlike the Fed, the ECB 
has not yet begun unwinding the bonds acquired from the previous recession and, in fact, 
continues to reinvest returned capital to buy even more assets. Below is the ECB’s current 
balance sheet, with the purple segment representing assets acquired as part of the quantitative 
easing program:104 
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A combination of these two factors means that the ECB does not have many monetary policy 
related tools to deploy in the event of another crisis.  In addition, many countries do not have 
much room to maneuver fiscally due to high debt burdens and perennial budget deficits. The 
Stability and Growth Pact, which limits yearly budget deficits to three percent, assumes balanced 
budgets in the medium term.  The up to three percent slack is designed to be used for fiscal 
stimulus; however, many countries flirt with breaching the three percent rule even in times of 
expansion. For example, France is expected to have a budget deficit of 3.4 percent of GDP next 
year.105  Deficits add to debt burdens which are already unsustainably elevated following the 
sovereign debt crisis.  With the exception of Germany, none of the countries in the graph below 
are seeing sizeable reductions in their debt burdens due to their ongoing yearly deficits:106  
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In addition, many of the current fiscal rules are regularly broken with impunity. The 
Stability and Growth Pact limits debt to 60 percent of GDP, but none of the countries besides 
Germany are anywhere close to that ‘limit’.  For example, Italy’s debt is currently over double 
the limit and is projected to increase in the next decade as seen in the graph above.  The 2018 
European Commission’s report concluded that: 
[the] debt-to-GDP ratio…[is] well above the Treaty reference value of 60% and, based on 
the Commission 2018 spring forecast, Italy was not compliant with the debt reduction 
benchmark in that year and is not expected to comply in 2018 and 2019 either… the 
Commission has prepared a report…analyzing whether or not Italy is compliant with the 
debt criterion of the Treaty.  The report concluded that the debt criterion…should be 
Ram 51 
considered as currently complied with, and that an [excessive deficit procedure] is thus 
not warranted at this stage.107  
In 2003, when France and Germany were supposed to be subject to punitive measures due to 
excessive budget deficits, EU finance ministers “refused to enforce treaty law” against the two 
countries and no punitive measures were assessed as a result.108 This decision has helped 
contribute to a sentiment that larger countries are not subject to the same compliance obligations 
as smaller countries like Greece, Portugal, and Ireland.  In addition, the overambitious nature of 
this goal is at odds with reality on the ground as seen by the graph above.   
The consequence is that the Stability and Growth Pact, designed to prevent moral hazard, 
is not taken seriously and presently has “no teeth and no credibility” because when countries 
“received letters from Brussels informing that their budget deficits exceed the ceilings and 
needed to be corrected, they would invariably respond with optimistic forecasts that strong 
growth would soon bring the deficits below the ceilings”.109 The SGP and the economic thought 
behind it are effective enough to fiscally straitjacket countries during crisis but not effective 
enough to eliminate the base concern.  As such, parties seeking to prevent moral hazard are 
unhappy because of the increase of risk sharing mechanisms post-crisis (discussed in next 
subsection).  Parties seeking fiscal flexibility are also unhappy due to the ongoing threat of 
enforcement limiting the ability of countries to stimulate their economy during downturns.   
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REQUIRED SOLUTIONS 
This unhappy marriage has existed in some form since the creation of the euro. Euro-
optimists projected that incremental integration would lead to convergence and that convergence 
would resolve the disparities and conflicting interests that were exhibited in the creationary 
period of the euro. However, euro-area countries have not converged as expected.  Rapid 
convergence of borrowing costs across the union greatly outpaced convergence of inflation, 
leading to large capital imbalances and overinvestment that led to bubbles in lower-income 
countries.110  Income disparities between the core and periphery stubbornly remain; GDP and 
productivity growth have not been sufficient to create real convergence of income or 
employment; productivity growth has diverged.111  The temporal synchronization of business 
cycles and financial cycles has occurred but cycle amplitudes have diverged.112 As a result, a 
single monetary policy cannot evenly address the entire bloc and the problem of divergent, 
asymmetric shocks is unsolved.  In the eurozone’s current state, therefore, some countries remain 
vulnerable to downturns while possessing a very limited toolkit of solutions. As long as this 
status quo continues to exist, the eurozone itself remains vulnerable and unsustainable.  
 As referenced in earlier sections, countries with less competitive economies need ways to 
adjust.  They currently cannot devalue their currency, run larger budget deficits to stimulate or 
subsidize their production, or implement policies that give preference to domestic goods and 
services.  In other currency areas, fiscal transfers, fiscal union, or debt mutualization are used to 
redistribute capital to protect from inevitable unequal capital flows and asymmetric shocks.  
Current initiatives underway, like the banking and capital markets union, would increase the 
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amount of risk sharing through the implementation of projects like euro-area deposit insurance to 
help diversify away risk.  In addition, cross-border capital flows would increase due to 
harmonized banking and market regulation that would provide equal protection and assurance 
throughout the bloc.  These initiatives will reduce the incidence and severity of asymmetric 
shocks and provide more financing opportunities at lower cost. Support for harmonization of 
rules and regulation exists among both creditor and debtor states because each gains something: 
creditor states have opportunities to invest more seamlessly and get higher returns with less risk, 
while debtor states will have lower borrowing costs.  More crucial, however, is the further 
delinking of the bank-sovereign loop by having external creditors hold more debt (as opposed to 
national banks).  However, even as initiatives to further integrate regulation through banking and 
market union have progressed, the portions of these initiatives that entail risk sharing have seen 
stubbornly slow progress.  An example of a portion requiring risk sharing is the European 
Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), a proposed pillar of the European Banking Union.  Without 
it, the bank-sovereign loop that brought the eurozone to its knees five years ago remains a 
potential problem. 
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SCHULD: GERMAN FOR BOTH ‘FAULT’ AND ‘DEBT’ 
 Unfortunately, Germany and other creditor nations remain steadfastly opposed.  Germany 
currently benefits from negative yields and miniscule debt servicing costs due to the robustness 
of its banking system and the perceived fiscal discipline of its government. Its status as a safe 
haven for capital would partially be undermined in the event that German-level creditor 
protections are rolled out throughout the eurozone.  In addition, following the implementation of 
a euro-area deposit insurance scheme, Germany would officially be responsible for bailing out 
non-German institutions.  Thus far, new mechanisms like the Single Resolution Fund and the 
European Stability Mechanism (previously discussed) are circuitously designed expressly to 
ensure risk sharing does not occur.113 The German finance minister, Olaf Scholz, said that “a 
common deposit insurance scheme is at the very end of the road toward an economic and 
currency union, and the road to that goal is long and full of conditions”.114 His ministry also 
stated that Berlin would not engage in talks to enter into EDIS until there was substantial 
reduction in European bank risk and that current proposals to reduce risk are insufficient.115  In 
addition, moral hazard concerns are frequently cited. However, as discussed in the optimal 
currency area subsection, a monetary union requires risk sharing; the Financial Times elaborates 
that “a monetary union without unified deposit insurance is not sustainable” and cites the 
example of the US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation which was created during the Great 
Depression to prevent bank failures.116 
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  In Germany and in other creditor countries, further eurozone integration remains 
unpopular.117  The prevailing public opinion in these countries is that German, Dutch, etc. 
taxpayers will be the ones that wind up paying for profligate spending and reckless risk-taking in 
debtor countries.118  In addition, despite the irrefutable role of quantitative easing in ending the 
euro crises, popular opinion in creditor countries remains hostile to the idea and perceives it as a 
duplicitous tool used to finance the broken Italian budget.119 As discussed in the creationary 
period of the euro, the constraints of public opinion are real and guide decisionmakers because 
they are held accountable during national elections.  As a result, the demonstrated public opinion 
in creditor countries, which has elements of moral superiority and reluctance for further 
integration, has negatively molded German policy towards the euro from before its inception 
through the inclusion of rules such as the no-bailout clause and unwillingness for fiscal transfers. 
Public outrage in Germany about debtor countries ‘living beyond their means’ and on German 
taxpayer money used to bail them out led to over half of Germans preferring that Greece left the 
eurozone in 2015.120  
 The German public’s propensity for austerity and deep-rooted resistance to risk sharing 
and fiscal transfers remains entrenched despite the calamitous effects of the financial and 
sovereign debt crises.  Both the German government statements and polls cited above imply that 
it is the fault of creditor countries for their state during and after the two crises. This stance of 
Germany and other creditor countries suggests that Germany’s participation in the eurozone has 
brought it a worse benefit-to-cost ratio when compared to the ratios of debtor countries. Such 
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arguments do not consider all of the benefits that Germany has enjoyed through its participation 
in the eurozone (enumerated in the first section).  However, as long as Germany maintains its 
opposition to further fiscal integration, mutualization of debt, and/or risk sharing, the eurozone 
remains the incomplete triangle that it was during the crisis.  
While the triangle remains incomplete, the same weak spots that catalyzed the crisis 
remain open and could catalyze another.  Every time a crisis occurs, public opinion of the 
eurozone and the EU more broadly drop drastically.121  As public opinion drops, reluctance to 
more integration increases even further. The takeaway from this causal chain is that German 
reluctance to integrate further results in other countries losing trust in the eurozone and also 
losing the will to integrate further.  By remaining in the status quo, the eurozone’s capital 
imbalances, vulnerability to asymmetric shocks, incongruent relative valuations, and bank-
sovereign negative loops will cause damage to countries that would have been avoided had they 
been stand-alone countries outside of the bloc.  Outside of the bloc, countries have a full toolbox 
of monetary and fiscal policies to stimulate their economy, conduct a tailored monetary policy, 
and improve domestic welfare through other means.  In addition, the entire eurozone is still 
reeling from the crisis that began five years ago, leaving it with even fewer monetary and fiscal 
policy tools to lessen future crisis effects. As long as German opposition to further integration 
remains, the combination of these factors will make leaving the eurozone more appealing than 
before and euroscepticism will continue to increase, making the long-term end of the eurozone 
more likely.122 
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“Italy is a slow-motion train wreck…” 
– Nouriel Roubini, June 2018 
ITALIA: TROPPO GRANDE PER FALLIRE  
 While the constraints of public opinion and moralism in Germany are a threat to the 
eurozone, another more immediate threat looms larger: the Italian debt load. Italy currently 
spends over 77 billion euros, or four percent of its entire gross domestic product, just paying 
interest on its existing debt load of over 2.5 trillion euros.123,124  Due to previously discussed 
measures by the ECB, such as LTRO, the share of nonresidents holding Italian debt has risen 
steadily to reach pre-crisis levels of over 30 percent.125  However, Italian banks are still 
overweight sovereign debt, with 8.5 percent of domestic bank assets consisting of Italian debt 
versus the eurozone average of 3.5 percent.126  This domestic asset composition means that 
Italy’s economic future, while improved, remains vulnerable to the bank-sovereign negative 
feedback loop.  If Italy were to experience a spike in debt-servicing costs and default on debt, the 
negative loop would push the country firmly back into crisis.  
The magnitude of damage that would accompany a potential Italian default cannot be 
overstated; when countries like Greece, Portugal, or Ireland required debt restructuring or a 
bailout, the eurozone struggled but was ultimately able to put together sufficient assistance 
packages.  Italy’s debt load is as large as the combined debts of France and Germany, which are 
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the eurozone’s biggest economies.127  Even the combined amount of outstanding Spanish, 
Portuguese, Greek, and Irish government debt is less than Italy’s present debt load.128  With the 
ECB holding about 25 percent of this outstanding Italian debt, it is clear that no one can afford an 
Italian default.129  As this subsection’s title states, Italy truly is too big to fail. 
 As such, a primary ongoing sustainability concern is the state of Italian sovereign debt. 
Given the anemic nature of Italian growth, its debt burden becomes even more worrying.  Italy’s 
economy contracted in both Q3 and Q4 2018, meaning that the country is technically back in 
recession. Over the past twenty years, Italy has seen many such quarters of negative GDP growth 
during quarters where the rest of the euro-area and world are growing.  Below is quarterly Italian 
GDP growth from 1998 to 2018; overall, the economy is still the same size as it was in 2004:130 
 
On top of no growth, Italian debt is rising; as a result, its debt-to-GDP is increasing further from 
its starting point of over twice the legal limit.  Currently, over 500 billion euros of Italian debt is 
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held by non-Italian European institutions.131 Italy currently requires issuing 400 billion euros a 
year to “keep the show on the road”, which worsens the bank-sovereign loop because the 
majority of this amount is still purchased by Italian banks.132  The entire European Stability 
Mechanism bailout fund is only 410 billion euros, which would only be enough to sustain Italian 
finances for a year.133  Beyond this point, more risk sharing or fiscal transfers would be required 
in the event of an Italian default; as we know, both of these solutions are deeply unpopular in 
creditor countries.  The country’s populist government also is not budging on its promises for tax 
cuts even as European-appointed oversight boards recommend raising taxes to lessen deficits.134  
As the country’s debt load increases and growth slows, any future increasing in 
borrowing costs (as experienced during the crisis) will be more likely to cause default and result 
in contagious effects that hurt unprotected banks throughout the euro-area.  In such an event, the 
debt load would be too large for the ECB or any other institution to guarantee or subsidize.  
Already large European ownership of Italian debt also decreases the possibility for debt write-
offs or restructuring for the same reasons Greece and other creditor countries were denied this 
luxury.  Thus, Italy remains as a ticking time bomb in its current state.  Another large increase in 
its cost of debt, when combined with its moribund economy, could lead to the ‘sudden stop’ 
discussed earlier, where the state becomes unable to pay its upcoming obligations or service its 
debt.  The size of this debt load guarantees that any default or restructuring will remove any 
remaining goodwill in creditor countries, further strain intra-eurozone relations, and serve as 
another potent, negative force on the eurozone’s stagnant economy.  
                                                 
131 Giovanni Salzano, Demetrios Pogkas, and Ben Sills, “Why Italy’s Debts Are Europe’s Big Problem,” accessed 
April 16, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2019-italian-banks/. 
132 Salzano, Pogkas, and Sills. 
133 Salzano, Pogkas, and Sills. 
134 David Reid, “Italy’s Deputy PM Di Maio Says Country Won’t Change Its Economic Path,” April 15, 2019, 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/15/italys-deputy-pm-di-maio-says-country-wont-change-its-economic-path.html. 
Ram 60 
CONCLUSION 
The eurozone in its current state is not sustainable.  Ongoing efforts to rectify its 
incomplete institutions will not be sufficient to create a well-functioning currency area due to a 
lack of willingness to compromise on key issues like risk sharing.  To create a sustainable 
currency area, the eurozone still needs to fulfill the criteria of optimal currency areas that it lacks 
and complete its institutions to allow for more fiscal union.  The crises that occurred from 2008 
to 2015 illuminated the eurozone’s current flaws and its need for more complete union.  The 
most important determinant of whether the ECB and the eurozone can weather future crises will 
be centered around the lessons learned from the sovereign debt crisis. Future focus on failed 
economic theories like austerity or a unipolar policy based on inflation will be sure to push the 
bloc over its tipping point given the continuing precariousness of eurozone finances. Given the 
recent, painful memories of the previous crisis, a better response should be expected; if the 
response is equivalent to last time, the eurozone will once again suffer the same reductions in 
credibility and buy-in.  The current status quo of the bloc leaves too many parties vulnerable, 
meaning that the eurozone cannot maintain its current limbo.  The bloc will only be sustainable if 
it reduces its current integration to allow countries more monetary and fiscal policy flexibility or 
if it increases integration to lessen the effects of asymmetric shocks and capital flows, loss of 
competitiveness, and concentration of risk. 
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